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Harris v. McRae: Clash of a
Nonenumerated Right with
Legislative Control of the
Purse
David T Hardy*
One of the most controversial issues surrounding abortion is whether the govern-
ment has a duty to finance abortionsfor indgents. This Article examines that issue
by juxtaposing the nonenumeratedright ofprivacy with legislativepreeminence in the
allocation ofpublicfunds The author reviews the history of the abortion right, the
right ofprivacy, and legislative preeminence inpubliefunding. The author then as-
serts that the nonenumerated right to obtain an abortion is subordinate to legislative
preeminence in the funding area The author explores this conclusion under first
amendment, equal protection, and due process analyses and finally concludes that
there is no convincing argument infavor ofa governmental duty to fnance abortions
for indigents.
INTRODUCTION
WHILE MOST constitutional issues are controversial, the legal
and moral issues relating to abortion and its procurement
have been subject to especially uncompromising conflict. The ex-
treme view each side has of the other is evidence of this ideologi-
cal dichotomy. Those individuals opposed to abortion, for
example, are characterized as puritanical "Neanderthals," while
those persons favoring abortion are referred to as baby-murdering
servants of a new Reich. This conflict becomes even more intense
when the issue of whether the government has a duty to finance
the procurement of abortion by indigents is injected into the de-
bate. Those individuals who resist the involuntary payment of
taxes to support abortion clash with those persons who want the
right to abortion equally available to all members of society.
What was formerly only violent invective escalates to total intel-
lectual war, with dispassionate analysis and historical perspective
as the first casualties.
The origin of the abortion conflict can be traced to its statutory
* B.A. (1972), J.D. (1975), University of Arizona College of Law. The author is a
partner in the law firm of Sando & Hardy.
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proscription during the latter half of the 19th century.' That pro-
scription had historical basis in the ancient and common law tra-
ditions2 and went unexamined until the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code recommendations in 1962. 3 Thereafter, many
groups sought the liberalization of abortion statutes, and they
achieved their first major legislative success in New York in 1970. 4
It was inevitable, however, that the Supreme Court would be
asked to reconcile the statutory disputes and rule on the abortion
issue.' This adjudicatory process began in 1973, by which time
only a quarter of the states had adopted Model Penal Code provi-
sions,6 when the Supreme Court, in the companion cases of Roe v.
Wade7 and Doe v. Bolton,' effectively imposed a judicially drafted
uniform statute on every American jurisdiction.
Roe v. Wade
The Court's landmark decision in Roe involved a challenge to
a "first generation" abortion ordinance.9 The 1871 Texas statute
in question completely outlawed the performance of abortions
which were not undertaken to save the life of the prospective
mother.'0 The Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun, struck
down the statute as violative of a constitutional right of privacy
that had its roots in the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments
and the penumbras of the Bill of Rights." I
The Court acknowledged, however, that this right of privacy
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138 (1973).
2. See Byrn, An American Tragedy, 41 FoRDHAM L. REv. 807 (1973).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2) (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) permitted abortion
when a substantial threat to the woman's physical or mental health existed, when there was
a substantial threat that the fetus would be deformed, or when the pregnancy resulted from
rape or incest.
4. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1970-1971). California, Colo-
rado, and North Carolina adopted the ALI proposal, see note 3 supra, in 1967 when it was
still considered far-reaching. By 1970, New York exceeded the proposal by giving elective
abortion across-the-board approval. Charles & Alexander, Abortions for Poor and Non-
white Women: 4 Denial of Equal Protection?, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 147 (1971).
5. A. DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99-103 (J. Mayer ed. 1969).
DeTocqueville perceptively noted a century and a half ago that most American political
conflicts eventually end in the judicial branch. Id.
6. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 182 (1973).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 116. A "first generation" abortion statute is exemplary
of the legislative proscription of abortion which occurred during the latter half of the 19th
century. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
10. 410 U.S. at 117.
11. Id. at 129, 152-53.
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was not absolute. At some point during pregnancy, the state inter-
ests in safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards, and
protecting potential life could become sufficiently compelling to
sustain the regulation of abortion.1 2 The Court discussed three
rationales that could justify Texas' restriction of abortions. The
first rationale, discouragement of sexual activity, was neither ad-
vanced by the state nor has it been seriously suggested by any
commentator. 13 The second rationale, medical hazards to women
stemming from abortion, may have represented a compelling state
interest when the legislature first enacted the Texas statute, but the
medical advancements since that time limit the rationale to the
latter stages of pregnancy. 4 The third rationale, protection of the
life of the unborn child, presented more difficulty for the Court in
Roe and represented the focus of the majority's discussion.15
In addressing the state's interest in protecting prenatal life,
Blackmun began by noting that the fetus does not constitute a
"person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment be-
cause the equal protection and due process clauses safeguard
political rights which cannot be exercised until after birth.'6 The
state, therefore, is not compelled constitutionally to protect the life
of unborn children under that amendment. States do use their
discretion, however, to extend protection to objects which are not
clearly "persons".' 7 Thus, the Court's inquiry into the protection
of prenatal life could not end with an analysis of "personhood"
under the fourteenth amendment.
Although the unborn child may not be a "person," the Court
continued, it is a potential life which the state may have a vital
interest in safeguarding.' 8 The Court faced the problem, there-
fore, of determining the point at which the protection of that po-
tential life becomes a compelling state interest. This
determination was difficult because the Court asserted it did not
want to speculate as to the moment life begins.' 9
12. Id. at 154.
13. Id. at 147-48. If this reason had been asserted by Texas as a valid state purpose,
the statute could have been challenged on overbreadth grounds for its failure to distinguish
between married and unmarried persons.
14. Id. at 148-50.
15. Id. at 150-52.
16. I'd. at 157.
17. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding ban on destruction
of draft cards).
18. 410 U.S. at 158-59.
19. Id. at 159. Texas urged that life begins at conception and, therefore, the state has
a compelling interest to protect life from that point onward. The Court noted, however,
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Thus, Blackmun seemed to paint himself into a juridical cor-
ner. If the right to life could override the right to abortion, and
reasonable persons could differ as to the point at which life begins,
then a state could define the right to life without fear that the judi-
ciary would impose its own legal interpretation of that right. A
statute similar to Texas', therefore, surely would survive judicial
scrutiny.
In contrast to this line of reasoning, however, Blackmun, seek-
ing to escape this trap, also noted that "in areas other than crimi-
nal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that
life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal
rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations
.... -20 This inconclusive statement suggests that since the com-
mon law of torts does not recognize the fetus as having life, the
statutory criminal law of Texas cannot. This implication, how-
ever, merely led to another problem: What if the state modified
both tort and criminal law to treat the fetus as a full human being?
Finally, Blackmun addressed the issue of whether a state could
protect the fetus from abortion by modifying its statutes to recog-
nize that the unborn child possesses legally protected rights in
every context. Blackmun simply stated: "We do not agree that,
by adopting one theory of life, Texas [or any other state] may
override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." 2'
Thus, Blackmun's reasoning came full circle: the state may re-
strict abortion to preserve life; reasonable persons may differ as to
the theory of when life begins, and the judiciary cannot impose its
own theory; but the state cannot override the right to abortion by
adopting a definition of life which would supercede that right.
The majority then outlined a statute which would meet the re-
quirements of its circular analysis. The proposed statute conve-
niently divided the nine month human gestation period into three
trimesters and applied a different standard to each trimester.22
During the first trimester, the state could impose no limitations on
the abortion decision.23 During the second trimester, the state's
interest increased and it then could "regulate the abortion proce-
that since those trained in medicine, philosophy, and theology could reach no consensus on
the question of life's beginning, the judiciary was incapable of making that determination.
Id. This statement can be viewed as arguing against the Court's overriding of such a legis-
lative determination.
20. Id. at 161.
21. Id. at 162.
22. Id. at 162-66.
23. Id. at 163-64.
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dure to the extent that the regulation reasonably related to the
preservation and protection of maternal health."'24 Requirements
of special licensing of persons or hospitals performing abortions,
for example, could be imposed. 5 Finally, at the beginning of the
third trimester, when the fetus became "viable" and able to sur-
vive outside the womb, the state could acquire a "compelling in-
terest" in protecting prenatal life and then could "go so far as to
proscribe abortion during that period except when it [would be]
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother."26
Doe v. Bolton
In Doe v. Bolton,27 the Court, again writing through Justice
Blackmun, struck down a Georgia "second generation" abortion
statute.28 The Georgia statute was patterned after the American
Law Institute's Model Penal Code and had been adopted as a lib-
eralization measure only five years before being challenged in the
Supreme Court.29 The statute permitted licensed physicians to
perform abortions where pregnancy "would endanger the life of
the pregnant woman or would seriously and permanently injure
her health," where the fetus would "very likely" be born with "a
grave, permanent and irremediable mental or physical defect" or
where the pregnancy resulted from rape.30 Additionally, the stat-
ute required that the woman be a state resident, the hospital be
accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH), and the physician's judgment be confirmed by two other
physicians and the hospital's abortion committee.3 ' The majority
held that the requirements of JCAH approval, two doctor concur-
rence and abortion committee approval were unconstitutional be-
cause these special protections were not required for other surgical
procedures.32
The concurring and dissenting opinions in the companion
cases of Roe and Doe were virtually identical. Justice Stewart
24. Id. at 163.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 163-64.
27. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
28. Id. at 182. A "second generation" abortion statute is exemplary of the wave of
legislation which sought to liberalize the proscriptive "first generation" abortion statutes of
the latter half of the 19th century. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
29. 410 U.S. at 182. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
30. 410 U.S. at 183.
31. Id. at 180-87, 191-200.
32. Id. at 193-200.
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concurred only in Roe, but Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Douglas filed concurrences in both cases. Both Stewart and Bur-
ger based their positions on substantive due process grounds
rather than on a broad constitutional right of privacy. 33 In so do-
ing, Stewart intimated that the Court was substituting its social
belief about abortion for that of the legislature-a process the
Court explicitly denounced in Ferguson v. Skrupa.3 Stewart then
asserted, however, that the substantive due process approach was
necessary to ensure women the liberty to decide whether to termi-
nate their pregnancies and to protect such liberty from abridge-
ment through sweeping laws such as the Texas statute at issue.35
In contrast, Douglas rested his concurrence entirely on a broad
right of privacy. This privacy right, articulated in Griswold v. Con-
necticuta6 and inextricably woven into the concept of liberty,
governed three classes of activity: (1) the intellect, taste, or per-
sonality; (2) the basic decisions of life, such as marriage; and (3)
the health and well-being of the individual, including the "free-
dom to walk, stroll or loaf."'37 Thus, Stewart, Douglas and Burger
agreed that endangering the life of the woman or seriously injur-
ing her health were standards too narrow to be upheld on either
substantive due process grounds or under a broad constitutional
right to privacy.
Justices Rehnquist and White dissented from the companion
cases of Roe and Doe. White's dissent was brief, noting that the
effect of the decisions was to deny legislatures the right to weigh
the competing interests of life and liberty.38 Rehnquist discussed
the issue more extensively, challenging the assumption that the
commercial decision to purchase an abortion could be described
as "private" and noting that the fourteenth amendment's guaran-
tee of liberty only extends to deprivation "without due process."39
Rehnquist also concluded that the Court's concession that abor-
tion had been outlawed in a majority of states for over a century
suggested that "the asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental .... . "
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 167-71; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 207-08.
34. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 169-70.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 209-15.
38. Id. at 221-23 (White, J., dissenting).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 164.
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The Court's decisions in Roe and Doe settled only one aspect
of the abortion conflict-whether state legislatures could constitu-
tionally criminalize abortion. Within two years, litigation com-
menced on a more difficult question: Whether the right to
abortion included not only a ban on the state criminalization of
abortion, but also an affirmative state duty to subsidize abortion
for indigents. In 1977, the Supreme Court answered this question
in the negative in three cases: Beal v. Doe,4 Maher v. Roe,42 and
Poelker v. Doe.4 3
Companion Cases of Beal, Maher & Poelker
In Beal, the Court held that Title XIX of the Social Security
Act, which established the Medicaid program, does not require a
state to fund nontherapeutic abortions. 4 Title XIX requires only
that state medical plans be consistent with the title and "include
reasonable standards" for determining "the extent of medical
assistance under the plan."4 The majority, writing through Jus-
tice Powell, decided that the state's interest in prenatal life does
not become a "compelling" one until the third trimester, and since
the statute requires only a reasonable classification rather than
one justified by a "compelling interest," the distinction was
upheld.'
In Maher, the court rejected a constitutional challenge to a
Connecticut statute limiting medical benefits for first trimester
abortions to situations where "[i]n the opinion of the attending
physician the abortion is medically necessary."'47 The Court noted
that the Constitution guarantees no right to subsidized medical
services, although where the state chooses to provide such serv-
ices, it must do so in a manner which does not violate the equal
protection clause.48
The Maher plaintiffs argued that the state statute accords dis-
parate treatment to abortion and childbirth by funding only the
medical expenses incident to the latter, thereby violating their fun-
damental right to abortion as guaranteed by Roe.4 9 The Court,
41. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
42. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
43. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
44. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 438.
45. Social Security Act of 1935 § 1902, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976).
46. 432 U.S. at 445-46.
47. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 466 n.2.
48. Id. at 469-70.
49. Id. at 467-68.
1981]
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however, found no fourteenth amendment violation. The state
statute did not discriminate because the distinction on which it
was based, financial need, does not constitute a suspect classifica-
tion." Furthermore, the court found no fundamental right, such
as that articulated in Roe, to be implicated by the Connecticut
statute.'
Roe concerned a statute imposing severe criminal punishment
for the performance of an abortion and not with a decision con-
cerning the allocation of limited public funds. Roe did not declare
an unqualoed constitutional right to abortion, but only the right to
be free from burdensome state interference in making a decision
to terminate a pregnancy. Thus, no limitation on a state's author-
ity to make a value judgment favoring childbearing over abortion
through the allocation of public funds could be implied from Roe.
The Court drew upon distinctions made in earlier decisions52 to
demonstrate that:
[TJhere is a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alter-
native activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional
concerns are greatest when the state attempts to impose its will
by force of law; the state's power to encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.53
It was this ability to differentiate between the more critical consti-
tutional concerns of Roe and the lesser concerns of Maher that led
the majority in Maher to apply a rational relation test to the stat-
ute at issue. 4 The application of that test, as opposed to strict
scrutiny, coupled with the Court's holding in Beal, resulted in the
conclusion that the funding limitation bears a rational relation-
ship to the state's interest in encouraging childbirth and can be
constitutionally upheld. 5 Thus, the Maher Court did not retreat
from its decision in Roe.
With the decisions in Maher and Beal as background, the
Poelker majority easily could hold that the city of St. Louis could
50. Id. at 470-71.
51. Id.
52. For this proposition, the Maher court cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
432 U.S. at 475 n.9. The Court also could have relied on earlier cases upholding federal
grants-in-aid intended to influence state decisionmaking on issues arguably of sole state
concern under the tenth amendment. See Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
580-85 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525-26 (1937);
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923).
53. 432 U.S. at 475.
54. Id. at 478-79.
55. Id.
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constitutionally limit the performance of abortions in city hospi-
tals except in situations where there was a threat of grave injury or
death to the mother. The Poelker majority, expressly relying on
Maher, asserted that it found "no constitutional violation by the
City of St. Louis in expecting, as a policy choice, to provide pub-
licly financed hospital services for childbirth without providing for
nontherapeutic abortions." 56
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in the
companion cases of Beal, Maher and Poelker. Brennan attacked
the majority's premise that a distinction should be made between
assisting and criminally penalizing an activity.57 Brennan instead
regarded the limitation of financial assistance as infringing on pri-
vacy rights "by bringing financial pressures on indigent women
that force them to bear children they would not otherwise have.
That is an obvious impairment of the fundamental right estab-
lished by Roe v. Wade."58 In Brennan's view, such legislation
"unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion" and must be justi--
fled by a compelling interest.59 Under Roe, however, the statute
would fail because of its conclusion that the interest in prenatal
life cannot meet such a high level of scrutiny during the first
trimester.
Marshall's dissent was based more on social considerations
than on standard concepts of constitutional law. Marshall criti-
cized the dichotomy between the strict scrutiny and rational basis
standards of review, suggesting that while poverty alone should
not entitle a class to claim government benefits, "it is surely a rele-
vant factor" in the consideration.6" Marshall also noted that non-
white women obtain abortions at twice the rate of white women
and are more heavily dependent on Medicaid.6 In rather intem-
perate language, Marshall criticized the Court's decision not to
sanction the funding of abortions as "an invitation to public offi-
56. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 521.
57. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 484-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 489.
60. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 457-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall termed the
dichotomy between the standards of review "outdated and intellectually disingenuous."
Id. at 457.
61. Id. at 459-60. Marshall based this conclusion on the statistic that non-white indi-
viduals are five times more dependent on Medicaid than white individuals. Id. Query
whether this assumption, that coincidence should be treated as causation, might be taken to
indicate that the Medicaid program itself unconstitutionally discriminates against white
individuals, rather than that its exclusions (presumably, any exclusions, not just those for
abortion) discriminate against non-white individuals.
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cials, already under extraordinary pressure from well-financed
and carefully orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to approve more
such restrictions" and chastised the elected officials as choosing to
"cower before public pressure. 62
Justice Blackmun, who had written the majority opinion in
Roe, was even more caustic. The legal analysis of his dissent was
limited to citations to Roe and Doe and statements that the major-
ity now "concedes the existence" of a right but "denies the realiza-
tion and enjoyment of that right. '63 Blackmun characterized the
majority's opinion in Beal as "punitive and tragic" and "disingen-
uous and alarming" because it ensured that "the cancer of poverty
will continue to grow."'  In addition, Blackmun attacked the
electorate, which had elected the appellant in one of the cases, as
"a presumed majority" which "punitively impresses upon a needy
minority its own concepts of the socially desirable, the publicly
acceptable, and the morally sound, with a touch of devil-take-the-
hindmost. 65
Even while the Maher trilogy of cases was under considera-
tion, however, another confrontation was incipient. On Septem-
ber 30, 1976, Congress enacted a restriction on the use of federal
funding for elective abortion as a rider to an appropriation bill. 66
The restriction, known as the "Hyde Amendment" because of its
chief sponsor in the House, Henry J. Hyde, provided that none of
the funds appropriated should be used to perform non-medically
needed abortions. 67
A Judicial Challenge to the Hyde Amendment
As might be expected, the Hyde Amendment soon elicited a
judicial challenge. Two actions which ultimately reached the
62. Id. at 462.
63. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 462-63.
65. Id.
66. Hyde Amendment to Medicaid Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat.
1430. The "Hyde Amendment" is used as a generic term for a series of amendments which
varied each fiscal year. The first form of the amendment prohibited the use of Medicaid
funds for abortion except where the pregnancy would endanger the mother's life. The
form used in most of fiscal 1978 and all of 1979 additionally funded abortions where preg-
nancy would cause "severe and long-lasting physical health damage" to the mother. The
fiscal 1980 version omitted this provision but added an exception for pregnancy resulting
from rape or incest. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302-03 (1980). The last version of the
amendment was at issue in McRae.
67. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1430 (1976).
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Supreme Court were filed the very day of its enactment.68 These
challenges were based on both the due process and the equal pro-
tection clause. The challenging parties, however, faced a more
difficult fact situation than in the nonfunding-related abortion
cases. In earlier challenges to the state laws, plaintiffs had been
able to argue consistently that abortion costs less than normal de-
livery for which financial assistance can be received, and, there-
fore, the state has no financial interest in refusing to pay for
elective abortion.69 Such an argument becomes considerably
more difficult to assert, however, when plaintiffs seek to challenge
a federal grant program which does not actually provide those
services but only attempts to reimburse state funding made avail-
able by the state's election. To argue that a limitation on the fed-
eral grant ultimately would cause a decrease in state-provided
abortion would require an argument that the absence of partial
federal reimbursement constitutes a financial barrier to states
choosing to fund abortion rather than childbirth. If abortion were
indeed less expensive than childbirth, however, the withdrawal of
federal funding certainly would not alter the financial balance and
preclude, on fiscal grounds, state provision of abortion instead of
childbirth.
The opinion in Harris v. McRae,70 written by Justice Stewart,
upheld the Hyde Amendment and relied heavily on Maher. The
challengers in McRae sought to distinguish the earlier opinion on
the ground that the forms of the Hyde Amendment in effect for
1976 through 1978 only permitted abortion to protect the health of
the mother7l and thus constituted a broader restriction than the
state plan at issue in Maher. The McRae majority found, how-
ever, that the Maher approach was applicable, noting generally
that "although government may not place obstacles in the path of
a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove
those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter cate-
gory." 2  The Court accordingly rejected the due process
challenge.
The majority in McRae had even less difficulty rejecting the
68. See notes 70-80 infra and accompanying text.
69. See, eg., Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1974). Seegenerally Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 453 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Doe v. Hale Hos., 500 F.2d 144,
146 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975).
70. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
71. See note 66 supra.
72. 448 U.S. at 316.
19811
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claims that the Hyde Amendment either establishes religion, by
allegedly reflecting Catholic doctrine, or infringes on the exercise
of religion, by requiring childbearing where religion requires
abortion. The latter challenge failed because the challengers were
unable to find any individuals seeking abortions under compul-
sion of religious belief.7 3 The former challenge failed because,
whatever the coincidence of the Hyde Amendment and the beliefs
of any particular religion, its principal purpose did not advance or
inhibit any particular religion or foster an entanglement with
such.74
The majority then considered the equal protection question,
relying heavily on the fundamental right and suspect classification
tests of Maher. First, the Court held that a woman's fundamental
right to freedom of choice does not embody a constitutional enti-
tlement to financial resources, even when such finances are neces-
sary for her to have an abortion to protect her own health." In
holding that the Connecticut statute did not discriminate against a
suspect class, the Court in McRae reasoned that it had never
regarded financial need as a suspect classification.76
In holding also that the statute did not implicate the funda-
mental abortion right as articulated in Roe, the Court sought to
differentiate the two cases. 7 7 Roe, it reasoned, did not declare an
unqualified constitutional right to an abortion, but instead it de-
clared the right to be free from burdensome state interference in
making a decision to terminate a pregnancy. According to the
Court in Maher, this right to be free from state interference was
violated by the statute in Roe, which imposed severe criminal
punishment for the performance of an abortion, but was not vio-
lated by the statute in Maher, which evidenced the state's decision
to favor childbirth over abortion through the allocation of public
funds. The statute in the latter case placed no obstacle before a
woman seeking her fundamental right to an abortion. Indigent
women continued to be dependent on private funding sources, just
as they were prior to the enactment of the statute. Thus, the Con-
necticut statute violated no fundamental right to abortion.7 Fur-
73. Id. at 319-20.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 312-18.
76. Id. at 323. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
29 (1973).
77. 448 U.S. at 312-18. For a discussion of this right, see notes 11-26 supra and ac-
companying text.
78. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474.
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thermore, the Maher Court found no suspect classification based
on wealth.7 9 The Hyde Amendment, therefore, was held not to
violate the equal protection clause by withholding public funding
for certain medically necessary abortions while providing funding
for certain other medically necessary services. With this decision
behind the Court, it is easy to understand its ruling in the compan-
ion case of Williams v. Zbaraz0 which held that a state is not
obligated under Title IX of the Social Security Act to pay for
medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is
unavailable under the Hyde Amendment."'
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented
from the McRae opinion. Blackmun's and Marshall's dissents82
merely echoed their earlier statements in Beal, Maher, and
Poelker.3 Justice Brennan, however, expanded on his earlier dis-
sent which treated the Hyde Amendment as an attempt to circum-
vent, through indirect legislation, the fundamental right to
abortion guaranteed by Roe. In Brennan's view, the majority's
opinion was flawed by "its failure to acknowledge that the dis-
criminatory distribution of benefits of government largesse can
discourage the exercise of fundamental liberties just as effectively
as can outright denial of those rights through criminal and regula-
tory sanctions. 8 4
The most creative and well-drafted dissent, however, came
from Justice Stevens, who had joined the majority in Maher. Ste-
vens distinguished Maher from McRae by noting that the chal-
lengers in Maher sought subsidies for purely nontherapeutic,
elective abortions, whereas in McRae the challengers sought such
assistance for abortions which might be in the broad health inter-
ests of the mother whose life was not at stake.85 To Stevens, the
state might refuse constitutionally to fund purely elective abor-
tions, but might not refuse to fund abortions necessitated by thera-
peutic but not life-threatening reasons. Stevens reasoned that if a
woman has a constitutional right to place higher value on avoid-
ing serious health harm than the state does on protecting potential
life, then that balance should hold whether criminal sanctions or
79. Id. at 470-71.
80. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
81. Id. at 369.
82. See 448 U.S. at 337 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text. Fully half of Blackmun's brief
dissent consisted of quotations from his Maher dissent. See note 63 supra.
84. 448 U.S. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 349-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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differential funding is involved.86 In Stevens' view, therefore, the
Hyde Amendment violated the duty of a sovereign to "govern
impartially."87
Collectively, the abortion decisions reflect the difficulty of de-
fining the scope of a nonenumerated constitutional right. Roe and
Doe recognized the right to obtain an abortion as constitutionally
based on the right of privacy,"8 and the Maher trilogy denied that
the state has an affirmative duty to subsidize abortion to protect
the exercise of that constitutional right.89 Furthermore, McRae
relieved the federal government of the duty to appropriate funds
for abortion.90 All of these decisions were accompanied by strong
concurrences and dissents which took issue with the concept and
scope of the constitutional nonenumerated right.9 ' A discussion
of the history surrounding the concept of nonenumerated rights
should be helpful, therefore, in understanding the Court's reason-
mng concerning abortion and its funding.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF NONEUMERATED RIGHTS
The concepts of "rights of the citizen against the government"
and "constitutional rights" are co-extensive to most Americans.
The rights possessed by the citizen, in the sense that there are ac-
tivities with which the government cannot legally interfere, are
viewed as having been created by the Constitution-the compact
between citizens and the government. Thus, courts which seek to
recognize a nonstatutory right must do so either by reference to
the Constitution or to a gloss placed on that document. By relying
on constitutional text, history, modem analogues of "Constitu-
tional norms", or the general notions of "due process" and "equal
protection," the courts can usually recognize, limit,92 or even abol-
86. Id. at 351.
87. Id. at 357.
88. See notes 9-40 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 41-65 supra and accompanying text.
90. See notes 70-80 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 33, 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. II, which provides that "[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed." Several federal courts have limited this right to the creation
of a militia, narrowly defining the term "militia." United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939). See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770
(1943); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942). But see U.S. CONST. amend. I,
which recognizes a "right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." Although the purpose ("for a redress of grievances") is
expressly made a limitation, courts consistently have extended this right to persons or
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ish the proposed right in question.93
It is vital to recognize, however, that this interpretation of
strict constructionism was totally alien to the framers of the Con-
stitution; in their eyes, rights were found in "natural law." Consti-
tutions and similar documents might recognize those rights or
provide guarantees that the government would not infringe them,
but the texts do not create the rights. As Alexander Hamilton,
scarcely a spokesman for individual liberties, stated: "The sacred
rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parch-
ments or musty records. They are written, as with the sunbeam, in
the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself,
and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power."94
The wording of the Constitution also reflects the concept that
enumerated rights were not created by the text of the Constitution,
but existed prior to the reduction of these principles to written
form. Thus, the first amendment does not speak of granting a
freedom of expression, but rather prohibits Congress from
"abridging the freedom ' 95 of speech or press; the second amend-
ment does not provide that the people shall have a right to keep
and bear arms, but rather that this existing right "shall not be in-
fringed;" 96 and the seventh amendment does not state that a right
to trial by jury shall be available in civil actions, but rather man-
dates that in such actions that right "shall be preserved." 97
groups unlikely to, or legally barred from, petitioning the government. See Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1945) (labor organizer soliciting members at a union meet-
ing for economic purposes); NLRB v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.2d 311, 318 (8th
Cir. 1945) (Chamber of Commerce). The dual standard between these amendments cannot
be justified from their text or history.
93. See generally Kadish, Methodology and Criterion in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957), Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emana-
tions, Things Fundamental and Things Forgottem The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235
(1965).
94. I PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 108 (B. Bailyn ed. 1965). Another
proponent of the natural law philosophy was an antifederalist who identified himself as "a
Columbian Patriot" and who was believed to have been either Elbridge Gerry or Mercy
Warren. He stated that "the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the abso-
lute rights which were vested in them by the immediate laws of nature .. " Observation
by a Columbian Patriot, in ANTIFEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SELECTED Docu-
MENTS 181, 182 (J. Lewis ed. 1967). For a discussion of the possible author of this quota-
tion, see P. FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1888); THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS (C. Kenyon ed. 1966); C. Warren, Elbridge Gerry, James Warren,
Mercy Warren and the Ratification of the Federal Constitution in Massachusetts, Proceed-
ings, Mass. Hist. Soe'y, LXIV (March 1931).
95. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
97. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
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The concept of nonenumerated constitutional rights also can
be examined within the context of the Bill of Rights. Initially, the
American Constitution contained no bill of rights, an omission
which had been rationalized on the ground that the framers were
creating a government of limited powers.9" Additionally, since no
power was given to the government to infringe certain rights, no
such power existed; any listing of rights, therefore, would have
been superfluous. Indeed, some of the supporters of the Constitu-
tion argued vehemently that the express listing of specific rights
might act as a threat to freedom since such enumeration could be
interpreted as conferring on government the power to infringe any
right not delineated expressly. 99
During the preliminary ratification process for the Constitu-
tion, however, the movement for a bill of rights gained momen-
tum.11° A variety of rights were designated as appropriate for this
special recognition. Pennsylvania demanded a constitutional
right to hunt and fish;' 01 New Hampshire asked for prohibitions
against government-chartered monopolies; 02 and Virginia sought
provisions for the re-election of officials, a broadening of the right
of suffrage, a prohibition against the suspension of law enforce-
ment without the consent of the legislature, and a requirement
that jury verdicts be unanimous for criminal convictions. 0 3 As a
98. John Jay, for example, rejected the argument that the Constitution did not ade-
quately secure the right of jury trial because "it expressly secures it in certain cases, and
takes it away in none," stating it "is absurd to construe the silence of this as authorizing
infringements of such a right, or of the right of expression." 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
497-98 (2d ed. 1888). See also 2 id. at 78.
99. See J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
640 (A. Koch ed. 1966). See also Address by James Wilson at the State House in Philadel-
phia, October 10, 1787, reprinted in CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 1781-1789, at
190 (F. McDonald & E. McDonald eds. 1968) in which Wilson voiced his concern that the
specific inclusion of a particular right in the Constitution might be viewed "to imply that
some degree of power was given [to the government] since we undertook to define its ex-
tent." Id.
100. The movement began in Pennsylvania where a minority of delegates to the state
convention pushed for ratification conditioned upon the adoption of a bill of rights. 2 M.
JENSEN, THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
596-99 (1976). While unsuccessful in the Pennsylvania convention, these proposals were
widely circulated and influenced the decision of the later conventions to demand a federal
bill of rights. E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 11
(1957).
101. JENSEN, supra note 100, at 598, 624.
102. DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERI-
CAN STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 1025 (1927).
103. Id. at 1029.
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result, when the task of drafting the Bill of Rights was assigned to
James Madison, he was faced more with an editing problem than
one of creative thinking.
Ultimately, only a small number of substantive rights were
given express recognition in the Bill of Rights. These rights were
placed in the first three amendments and were limited to the rights
of expression, assembly (for petitioning the government),104 and
the keeping and bearing of arms, as well as the prohibition against
the peacetime quartering of troops in the homes. The remaining
amendments focused on procedural rather than substantive mat-
ters. 10 5 The ninth and tenth amendments, however, recognized
the existence of "constitutional rights" other than those expressly
listed and provided that "[tihe enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people" and that "the powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."'t°6
Thus, the Bill of Rights recognized only a few substantive rights,
and continued to recognize the "natural law" distinction between
a constitutional and an enumerated right.
Over the last century, the general expansion of federal powers
has made the concept of "a government of limited powers" 7 an
empty slogan.'08 Additionally, the triumph of utilitarianism has
undermined both the ability of the courts to look to "natural law"
and, at least at the theoretical level, the importance of the judici-
ary as a constitutional policymaker. Traditionally, the legislature
has been regarded as the best body for determining what is condu-
cive to "the greatest good for the greatest number." As a result,
the ninth and tenth amendments, which could have been defined
by the judiciary, have vanished from the Constitution. The practi-
cal effect of this philosophical shift is that the written text of the
Constitution has become enshrined as the sacred writ of a secular,
104. Rhode Island, however, had called for the "right peaceably to assemble together,
to consult for their common good, or to instruct their representatives." Id. at 1053.
105. L. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 415-16 (1968).
106. U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X. The only mention of the ninth amendment in federal
decisions is in abortion cases where the courts appear embarrassed by its citation. See, eg.,
Hawaii Psychiatric Ass'n v. Ariyosbi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1037 (D. Hawaii 1979); Reilly v.
Leonard, 459 F. Supp. 291, 299 (D. Conn. 1978).
107. This phrase reflects the original objective of the Constitution. See note 98 supra
and accompanying text.
108. See L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTTIONAL LAW 224-32 (1978).
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legalistic religion. °9 Likewise, claims that rights exist even
though they are not recognized within the text of the Constitution
increasingly are viewed as antiquated sophistry. This approach,
however, is obviously impractical because recognition of plenary
power limited only by the few express strictures of the Bill of
Rights ultimately is inconsistent with a liberal democracy." 0
During the 20th century, the courts have responded to this lim-
ited interpretation of constitutional rights by creating a series of
glosses on the constitutional text. Thus, the guarantee that no per-
son "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself"' " became both a "right against self-incrimina-
tion""2z and a "right to remain silent" 13 which could be waived
only after hearing certain warnings and responding to specified
questions in a certain manner." 4  Likewise, rights against war-
rantless searches and seizures and the stationing of troops in pri-
vate dwellings were interpreted as creating a "penumbra" which
included a "right of privacy.""' 5 This privacy right, essentially a
protection of physical seclusion, then was defined as a "right to be
109. The concept of the Constitution as a secular religion is developed in Levinson,
"The Constifution"inAmerican CiviIReligion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123. Levinson notes that
the different treatments of constitutional "scripture" tend to divide along traditional Catho-
lic-Protestant religious lines. The literalist interpretation, for instance, relies solely on the
textual tradition. This school takes the position that everyone must interpret the text for
himself (e.g., a President may hold to an interpretation of the Constitution contrary to that
of the Court) and rejects the view that the Supreme Court is essentially "infallible" on
matters of constitutional dogma. Id.
110. There is nothing on the face of the Constitution, for instance, which would pro-
hibit the federal government from freely engaging in any form of racial discrimination.
I 11. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
112. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (the "privilege reflects the limits of the
individual's attornment to the state"); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966)
(discussing the "basic purpose" behind the privilege against self-incrimination); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (referring to "the Fifth Amendment's exception from compul-
sory self-incrimination").
113. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (referring to a right "to remain silent unless
[the defendant] chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will"). The distinc-
tion between a right against being compelled to speak and a right to remain silent may
seem nonexistent, yet it lies at the heart of later cases such as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). If the right is one against being compelled to speak, the notion of "waiver" is
obviously inapplicable; how can one ever consent to being compelled to take an action?
The waiver concept is applicable only if the underlying right is one to remain silent and not
merely to be free from being forced to speak.
114. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Paradoxically, while requiring full
warnings and free decision in an area which does not involve a true waiver, see note 113
supra, the Court has refused to extend these requirements to consent to a warrantless
search which does involve a waiver of a right. See Scbneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973).
115. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
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let alone," ' and further defined as a right to be free from the
enforcement of certain statutes which infringe family relation-
ships." 7 Eventually, the courts came to rely on constitutional
glosses and lengthy opinions were written that failed to quote the
constitutional provision in question.11 8
This approach for determining constitutional rights was not
without merit; it placed further restrictions on a government
which had become one of general powers under a constitution
providing only the minimal express restraints appropriate for a
government of limited powers. This approach also tended, how-
ever, to create a hodgepodge of inconsistent rulings, dependent on
no more than the values and social inventions of a majority of the
court." 9 Yet it was exactly this link to subjective values which
had caused a significant objection to the notion of "natural law."
The concept of constitutional rights utilized by the 20th cen-
tury judiciary frequently lacks the universality found in the natu-
ral law concept of constitutional rights. Accordingly, it becomes
possible for a right of privacy to protect one who obtains an abor-
tion pursuant to a medical procedure in a public clinic,120 but not
protect one who possesses marijuana for personal use in the base-
ment of his or her home.' 21 Remarkable exercises in constitu-
tional "newspeak" become possible as the gloss placed on the
Constitution is expanded. Legislatures can pass laws which un-
116. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
117. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479.
118. The observation of one recent commentator that the Court was relying on a
"rather unusual source for First Amendment doctrine" when "it looked at and relied on
the text of the First Amendment" is not entirely ironic. Schauer, "Private" Speech and the
"Private" Forur Givhan v. Western Line School District, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 217, 226.
Schauer explains: "In the past the text has hardly been a popular source for free speech
methodology." Id.
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the majority opinion, one concurring opinion,
and four dissenting opinions established a minimum of three constitutional tests and never
quoted from the text of the Constitution, with the exception of two references to the four-
teenth amendment and an implicit reference to constitutional "liberty" in the majority
opinion. 448 U.S. at 312.
119. See, eg., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 221 (White, J., dissenting). See also note 34
supra and accompanying text.
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121. National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Bell, 488 F. Supp.
123 (D.D.C. 1980); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Del. 1976). Cf
Camohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980) (constitutional right to privacy
held not to extend to an individual's right to use Laetrile free from governmental police
power); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973) (law prohibiting physician to
dispense controlled substances outside of his or her professional practice held not violative
of the right of privacy in a physician-patient relationship).
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questionably restrict the right to freedom of speech or of the press
if they can claim such restrictions will ultimately increase the to-
tality of freedom of expression. 122 Government employees may
be prohibited from engaging in political activities if the justifica-
tion is that their supervisors might otherwise exert pressure on
them, thereby infringing their political liberties. 123 Indeed, in
view of a substantial minority of the Court, some government offi-
cials may be fired because of their membership in a political party
to promote free political involvement and association.124 Thus,
many of the "natural law" constitutional rights no longer are pro-
tected under the Constitution due to the inconsistencies in the in-
terpretive glosses of the modem judiciary.
II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AS A NONENUMERATED RIGHT
The right of privacy ultimately recognized in Roe v. Wade125
can be regarded as the archetypical constitutional right based on
elaboration of a textual constitutional right.'26 In analyzing the
history of the right of privacy, it is vital to distinguish between the
different concepts encompassed within the legal notion of privacy.
The concept of a physical privacy, in which certain physical areas
are protected legally from intrusion, probably antedates written
records of English law. In the early Anglo-Saxon law, for in-
stance, minor criminal offenders received double and triple penal-
ties if the crime was committed within the boundaries of a
person's home.'27 When the English writ system, under Henry II,
began to expand into the "common law," writs for the protection
of physical possession of real estate and the security of that posses-
sion against physical intrusion and trespass were among the first
of such rules to be expanded. 28
The development of this right of physical privacy into a per-
sonal right to be free from intrusion, not only from other individ-
uals but from the ruling power, is of a more recent origin. Al-
though officials frequently searched the homes of "disaffected per-
122. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
123. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548 (1973); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
124. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1980).
125. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also notes 9-26 supra and accompanying text.
126. See notes 110-24 supra and accompanying text.
127. J. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND FROM THE
ENGLISH SETTLEMENT TO 1485, at 5 (1937).
128. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 516-17 (3d ed. 1927).
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sons" for arms in the period between 1660 and 1688,129 the
Declaration of Rights of 1688 makes no mention of a right against
unreasonable search and seizure by the sovereign. 130 The fourth
amendment to the Constitution, however, expressly recognizes
that right as a fundamental part of American constitutional
law.131
The recognition of a right of privacy which would protect
more than physical interests is a development of the last century.
The pivotal thinking regarding the right of privacy is found in an
article written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in
1890.132 These authors argued for the recognition of a civil rem-
edy for the invasion of certain forms of "privacy." The first form
of "privacy" concerned the use of a person's name or photograph
in commercial advertising without that person's consent.1 33 The
second form of privacy dealt with the portrayal of that person or
his or her opinions in a "false light". 134 Finally, the third form of
privacy sought to protect individuals against the surveillance or
publication of activities they sought to keep private.1 35 While the
concepts of Warren and Brandeis ultimately secured acceptance
by the American judiciary, 36 it is noteworthy that while these ar-
guments were designed to create a civil, nonconstitutional remedy
against private infringements, none of them had any reference to
invalidating statutes, and only the third form of "privacy" had
even tangential reference to criminal enforcement techniques.1 7
It took the expansion of modern electronic technology to initi-
129. See J. MALCOLM, DISARMED: THE Loss OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs IN RESTO-
RATION ENGLAND (Mary Ingraham Bunting Institute, Radcliffe College, 1980); 2 T. MA-
CAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES II, at 137 (1856).
130. The Declaration of Rights did complain that James II had forfeited his right to
rule by causing Protestant subjects "to be disarmed" while Catholics were not and resolved
that "the subjects which are Protestant may have arms for their defense suitable to their
conditions and, as allowed by law." 1 GuL & Mar., sess. 2, c.2 (1688). Only a year before
the adoption of the American Bill of Rights, the great English constitutionalist Edmund
Burke referred to the 1688 Bill as the "cornerstone ofour Constitution." L. BREVOLD & R.
Ross, THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND BURKE 192 (1970).
131. "mhe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
132. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
133. See Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888).
134. See Abernathy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch. 209 (1825).
135. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 132, at 213-14.
136. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
137. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 132, at 213.
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ate the incorporation of the Warren and Brandeis form of privacy
into constitutional law. With the development of electronic sur-
veillance techniques, it became possible to eavesdrop on conversa-
tions without physically intruding into the area of conversation.
Initially, the eavesdropping activity was held constitutionally per-
missible since it did not involve a physical intrusion, even though
the practical effect of that activity had the potential to be more
invasive than the traditional search.
In 1967, however, nearly eight decades after the publication of
the Warren and Brandeis article, the Supreme Court concluded
that the fourth amendment's prohibition against warrantless
searches protected a "zone of privacy" which might be invaded by
electronic forms of surveillance. 3 ' Later, in Stanley v. Georgia,'39
the Court recognized the possibility that a right of privacy in-
dependent of the fourth amendment might exist which would pro-
tect against enforcement of certain criminal laws that required the
invasion of a private household in a search for pornography.140
The express elevation of the right of privacy to an independent
constitutional right was accomplished in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut 141 where the Court concluded that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees .... ,, 142 As a result, the Court ruled that a Connecti-
cut statute banning the sale or possession of contraceptive devices
was unconstitutional. 43 The Court provided two rationales for its
decision. First, enforcement of the state statute, which apparently
had not been enforced for many years, would involve a physical
invasion of the home and the marital bedroom."' Second, and
more importantly, the underlying principle of the statute, restrict-
ing the choice of couples with regard to having children, invaded
the family relationship. 14  The third rationale was particularly
helpful in expanding the constitutional protection of privacy be-
138. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
139. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
140. Id. at 565.
141. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Pardoxically, the right to possess pornography in the home,
articulated by the Court in Stanley, has not achieved such status; the Court has ruled that
fourth amendment protections do not extend outside the physical confines of the home.
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1973). Cf. Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d
1110, 1114 (1st Cir. 1974) ("the right to be left alone extends only to the home and not to
conduct displayed under the street lamp on the front lawn").
142. 381 U.S. at 484.
143. Id. at 485.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 486.
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cause it prohibited an invasion which was detached entirely from
physical intrusion. This second theory also recognized that cer-
tain intangible relationships might be protected under the con-
cept of "privacy," regardless of the method of intrusion. It was
through its reasoning in Griswold, therefore, that the Court
opened the door to its decision in Roe v. Wade. 46
An analysis of the historical foundations of the right of privacy
has shown that the modem notion of this right is largely a result of
judicial glosses placed on the constitutionally enumerated right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 47 Although the in-
terpretive gloss approach to the determination of constitutional
rights is not without merit, it has been criticized for creating in-
consistent rulings.1 48 Two examples of this inconsistency are the
judicial recognition of a privacy right to obtain an abortion 149 and
the judicial recognition of a governmental right to limit the subsi-
dization of abortion even when the state prevents a woman from
obtaining an abortion.' Before examining this inconsistency fur-
ther, some background on the constitutional basis for govern-
mental financial allocations is needed.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR LEGISLATIVE
PREEMINENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL FINANCIAL
ALLOCATIONS
If the antecedents of a right of privacy can be traced to early
English law,' then the origins of a special preference for
financial decisionmaking by elected representatives can be traced
to a similar origin. Throughout most of the formative period of
the common law, the concept of the central government as an in-
stitution financed by the people and operated for their benefit did
not exist. The king's affairs-waging of wars to extend his do-
main, enforcement of his peace, maintenance of his household,
and reward of his supporters-were expected to be financed out of
his own funds. The king amassed these funds chiefly from his
land revenues and specialized fees which he would exact from the
nobility on such occasions as the death of a nobleman or the mar-
146. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
147. See notes 125-46 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 118-24 supra and accompanying text.
149. See notes 9-40 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 41-87 supra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
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riage of his eldest son.' 52
To secure revenue or "aids" beyond these amounts, however,
the king was obliged to convene representatives of the people and
request the granting of an aid 'per commune consilium et assensum
concillii.' 53 As this request was a matter of grace with the repre-
sentatives, they were free to refuse. The king had only a few pow-
ers of retaliation, as demonstrated by John's 1199 order to turn
out grazing animals and resisting abbots from his forest pas-
tures.' 5 4 John's attempts at more serious retaliation and greater
exploitation of the aids resulted in the creation of the Magna
Carta which reestablished the requirements of consent to sover-
eign actions and placed limits on the king's demands. Even after
the great centralization efforts of the kings in the 13th and 14th
centuries, "[t]he governing rule is that of the past: aid is by the
free will of the subjects. The King should live of his own."' 155
This fundamental notion that people had power over finances
lay at the very heart of the elected representative governing body.
The substantive parliamentary power was limited initially to peti-
tioning the king for recognition of a law.' 56 By 1340, the future
House of Commons was using "the power of the purse" to gain
control of more substantive powers. This legislative body then be-
gan to give aid to the king "on the condition that the King would
grant their petitions" for laws. 157 The "power of the purse" was
thus the original function and primary power of the elected legis-
lature under the English system. The American colonists who
protested against taxation without representation and who de-
manded their right to legislative representation acted against a
background of political thought which was a contemporary of the
common law itself.
The preeminence of the legislature in financial matters thus
became part of the foundation of the American governmental sys-
tem. The Declaration of Independence listed both the imposition
of taxation'58 and the forced payment of funds to erect new of-
fices 159 among the most evil of injuries and usurpations aimed at
152. J. JOLLIFFE, supra note 127, at 220-21.
153. Id. at 243.
154. Id. at 244.
155. Id. at 395.
156. Id. at 377.
157. Id. at 380 n.6 (quoting Rotwii Parliamentorum, ii. 113); B. LYON, A CONSTrru-
TIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 550 (2d ed. 1980).
158. Declaration of Independence § II, cl. xvii.
159. Id. § II, cl. x.
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creating an absolute British tyranny. 160 The tradition that only
elected representatives could control financial matters was carried
into Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution' 6' which provides that
all revenue bills must originate in the House of Representatives. 162
This provision, however, did not satisfy everyone and the dissatis-
faction found voice in the Virginia proposal for a Bill of Rights
which was echoed almost identically by North Carolina and
Rhode Island. The proposal stated:
[E]lections of Representatives in the legislature ought to be free
and frequent, and all men having sufficient evidence of perma-
nent common interest with, and attachment to the community
ought to have the right of suffrage: and no aid, charge, tax or
fee can be set, rated, or levied upon the people without their
own consent, or that of their representatives, so elected, nor can
they be bound by any law, to which they have not in like man-
ner assented for the public good. 163
While rarely citing this constitutional and legal background,
the modem Supreme Court repeatedly has acknowledged the pre-
eminence of the legislative branch in judgments concerning fiscal
matters and, more particularly, public funding of social pro-
grams.' The Court generally has imposed the "rational relation-
ship" test rather than the "strict scrutiny" test for such programs,
thereby reducing judicial input and increasing legislative input
into the decisions in this area. 165 The Court also has refused to
recognize indigency as a "suspect classification" to avoid the invo-
cation of strict scrutiny. 166 As a result, the Court has narrowly
160. Id. § II.
161. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
162. When the Constitution was adopted, Senators were not elected directly by the
people. Article I, § 3 provided that the Senate should be composed of Senators chosen by
the legislatures of their respective states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. This provision was super-
seded by the seventeenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
163. H. R. Doc. 398, supra note 102, at 1029. See also id. at 1045 (North Carolina
proposal) and 1052 (Rhode Island proposal).
164. See, ag., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
165. See, eg., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). A "rational relationship" requirement is no
guarantee that a statute will be upheld, but it certainly improves the probability of such a
holding. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
166. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29. The applica-
tion of strict scrutiny usually leads the Court to strike down the statute in question. Winter,
The Changing Parameters of Substantive Equal Protection: From the Warren to the Burger
Era, 23 EMORY L.J. 657, 663 n.14 (1974). One exception may be Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752 (1973).
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circumscribed the authority of the judiciary regarding legislative
fiscal matters.
In a series of cases beginning the year before Roe v. Wade,167
the Court continued in its tradition of deferring to legislative judg-
ment in financial matters and upheld legislative fiscal decisions
against a variety of challenges. In Jefferson v. Hackney,168 the
Court considered the constitutionality of a state welfare program
which compensated Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) recipients at a substantially lower rate than persons re-
ceiving other forms of welfare. In upholding this compensation
scheme, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the AFDC
recipients (87%) who received this reduced compensation were
black or Mexican-American, the Court noted that the number of
minority members in all categorical assistance programs is sub-
stantial. Furthermore, "given the heterogeneity of the Nation's
population, it would be only an infrequent coincidence that the
racial composition of each grant class was identical to that of the
others." 169
In United States v. Kras,70 the Court permitted the govern-
ment to refuse a bankruptcy discharge to an indigent who could
not pay the bankruptcy filing fee.' 7 ' While the Court had indi-
cated earlier that the government could not constitutionally
charge indigents for services on which it held a legal monopoly
(e.g., marriage and divorce),172 Kras suggested an extremely nar-
row construction for this rule in deference to the legislative
scheme. 73
Thus, the constitutional basis of legislative preeminence in
governmental fiscal matters is rooted deeply in the English com-
mon law, American political philosophy, and the American judi-
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
169. Id. at 548.
170. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
171. The plaintiff in Kras had been unemployed for four years, had a child suffering
from cystic fibrosis, owned $50 in nonclothing assets, and owed several thousand dollars in
debts. The plaintiff was, in short, the model plaintiff for a challenge to indigency-related
discrimination. Id. at 438.
172. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
173. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, took the position that the government has
no monopoly on bankruptcy relief. Blackmun reasoned that while bankruptcy, like mar-
riage, only can be obtained by an act of government, a debtor can achieve a similar result
by negotiating with creditors. 410 U.S. at 445-46. Precisely how Kras, with $50 in assets
and several thousand dollars in debts, was to undertake such negotiations was not
explained.
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ciary. This traditional authority of the legislature in financial
affairs must be examined in light of the expanding notion of con-
stitutional nonenumerated rights to determine whether a grave
constitutional inconsistency exists between the two concepts. 174
The next section of the Article will address this question as it re-
lates to abortion.
IV. PUBLIC FUNDING OF ABORTION AND CHILD DELIVERY:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF PRIVACY VERSUS
LEGISLATIVE PREEMINENCE IN FUNDING
The traditional legislative role in public finance policymak-
ing175 and the judicially expanded right of privacy176 conflict with
the allocation of public finances to provide abortion for indigents.
In Roe v. Wade, 177 the Court struck down a statute imposing a
criminal ban on abortion based on the right of privacy. Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, was joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Powell, 17 8 with Justices Stewart and Burger
concurring on substantive due process principles 17 9 and Justice
Douglas concurring on privacy grounds.18 0 Four years later, the
Maher trilogy of decisions upheld state statutory restrictions of
governmental funding for abortion when the two dissenters in
Roe, Rehnquist and White, were joined by Stewart, Burger, Pow-
ell, and Stevens.' 8 ' These differing alignments of Justices on the
abortion issue suggest that the scope of the constitutional
nonenumerated right to obtain an abortion is curtailed signifi-
cantly when juxtaposed to the traditional legislative right to allo-
cate public funds.
The minority opinions in the Maher trilogy also mirrored the
ideological conflict underlying the public funding of abortions, re-
flecting the unsettled nature of the traditional legislative right to
allocate funds. Although two of the Maher dissenters, Brennan
and Marshall, remained consistent with their majority position in
Roe, the third dissenter, Blackmun, broke sharply with his prior
opinions in governmental funding matters.'82 Blackmun did not
174. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 151-74 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 125-46 supra and accompanying text.
177. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. Id. at 113-202.
179. Id. at 207-08.
180. Id. at 209-20.
181. Justice Stevens had since replaced Justice Douglas on the Court.
182. Justice Blackmun criticized not only the public official who had restricted abortion
1981]
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attempt, for example, to reconcile his position in Maher with his
majority opinion in Kras.8 3 In Kras, Blackmun upheld a refusal
of a discharge in bankruptcy to an indigent who could not afford
to pay the bankruptcy filing fee.' 4 Blackmun also did not recon-
cile his viewpoint in the abortion area with his prior decisions to
join the majority in Jefferson v. Hackney'8 5 and Ornstein v.
Schwab.' 6 Thus, Blackmun's varied positions on legislative pre-
eminence in public funding underscore the conflict that exists
when the issue of the public funding of abortions is before the
Court.
Even though the Court has declared that the legislative right to
allocate public funds is preeminent over the constitutional
nonenumerated right to obtain an abortion," 7 the context in
which this decision was made warrants closer examination. To so
examine, it is necessary to analyze the first amendment, due pro-
cess, and equal protection arguments brought forward in the
Maher and McRae series of cases.
V. DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPOSE A CONSTITUTIONAL
DUTY TO FUND ABORTION FOR INDIGENTS?
The challengers in Harris v. McRae"'8 began their attack on
the Hyde Amendment, which restricted the use of federal funds
for elective abortion, with a two-pronged argument based on the
religion clauses of the first amendment. These individuals argued
initially that the Hyde Amendment was a violation of the estab-
lishment clause since it legally codified Roman Catholic doctrines
which were highly antagonistic to abortions other than those nec-
essary to save the mother's life. The challengers' second position
funding but also the citizens who had elected that official-referring to them as "a pre-
sumed majority" who in choosing him had "punitively impresse[d] upon a needy minority
its own concepts of the socially desirable, the publicly acceptable, and the morally sound,
with a touch of devil-take-the-hindermost." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 462-63. Blackmun
added that as a result of the Court's opinion, "the cancer of poverty will continue to grow.
This is a sad day for those who would regard the Constitution as a force that would serve
justice to all evenhandedly and, in so doing, would better the lot of the poorest among us."
Id. at 463.
183. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
184. Id. at 438. For additional information on the Kras challenger, see note 171 supra.
185. 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (Texas system of social security which results in varied treat-
ment of relief categories found to be rational).
186. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (filing fee requirement held not to be violative of rationality
test under the equal protection clause even though its impact was differential).
187. See notes 164-74 supra and accompanying text.
188. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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was that the Hyde Amendment violated guarantees of the free ex-
ercise of religion because it restrained a person whose religion re-
quired abortion from obtaining one. Both the district court and
the Supreme Court quickly rejected these challenges. Although
the Hyde Amendment may coincide with certain religious beliefs,
the Court held that this fact, without more, would not support a
finding that the amendment contravened the establishment clause
of the Constitution."8 9 The Court rejected the second prong of the
challengers' argument on standing grounds because the challeng-
ers were unable to locate a party who expected to be pregnant,
was eligible to receive Medicaid, and whose religious beliefs com-
pelled her to obtain an abortion.1 90
The Court's rejection of the challengers' two-pronged argu-
ment is justified by both a factual and legal analysis. Factually, it
is difficult to accept the proposition that opposition to nonlifesav-
ing abortions is purely a religious response based on the tenets of
Catholicism or that religious support is mustered only on one side
of the issue. Individuals belonging to religious groups frequently
have chosen their positions without regard to group mores. Reli-
gious organizations also have been grouped on both sides of the
question in largely unpredictable fashion.191 Although Catholic
teachings oppose abortion in most cases, Justice Brennan, the sole
Catholic on the Supreme Court, voted with the majority in two
critical abortion decisions.' 92 Although Jewish groups have gen-
erally supported the free availability of abortion, one of the best
treatises opposing such a procedure on moral grounds was au-
thored by a Jewish physician. 93 Thus, it is highly unlikely that all
members of a religious group will shape their moral decisions
solely on the basis of the doctrine of their religious organization.
189. Id. at 318-20.
190. Id. at 320-21. The Court divided the named challengers into three categories:
"(1) the indigent pregnant women who sued on behalf of other women similarly situated,
(2) the two officers of the Women's Division [of the Board of Global Ministries of the
United Methodist Church], and (3) the Women's Division itself." Id. at 320. The first
category of challengers lacked standing because they did not show that their religious be-
liefs compelled them to have an abortion. The other two categories of challengers did not
have standing because they failed to show that they anticipated becoming pregnant or were
eligible for medical funding under a federal program. Id.
191. Five years before Wade-Bolton, for example, the Unitarian Universalist Associa-
tion decided to urge "that efforts be made to abolish existing abortion laws except to pro-
hibit performance of an abortion by a person who is not a duly licensed physician."
Tentative Agenda, Seventh Annual General Assembly of the Unitarian Universalist Asso-
ciation, May 23, 1968.
192. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
193. B. NATHANSON, ABORTING AMERICA (1968).
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The Court also can justify its rejection of the challengers' two-
pronged argument from a legal standpoint. Most American laws
import some manner of moral judgment, primarily Judeo-Chris-
tian in nature. The Constitution's commands of equality can be
traced to theological concepts of the soul,1 94 and its prohibition on
self-incrimination can be linked to the ecclesiastical proscription
of suicide.195 The Court's refusal to strike down a law which may
have a moral component, but which does not advance or inhibit
religion, 196 is a rational response to these considerations.
A further problem with this two-pronged challenge is that it
fails to acknowledge the unusual structure of the first amend-
ment's religion clauses. These clauses prohibit not only the estab-
lishment of religion but also infringements on religion. The
legislature would not "establish" a religion; if anything, it avoids
"infringing" on the beliefs of the members of any religious
group. 197 The Hyde Amendment offers a similar observation
since it does not prohibit abortion but rather avoids the use of
legal coercion (taxes) against those individuals who would not
contribute voluntarily to the funding of such a procedure. Thus,
the Hyde Amendment embodies the rationale of the establishment
clause since it prohibits the financial support of a procedure where
a step necessary to that support infringes on religious beliefs. 98
The rejection of the first amendment argument in Mc.Rae,
194. Deism represents the root of the constitutional doctrine developed by the framers
and their contemporaries. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
Those individuals who think that the equality of all human beings stems inevitably
from "reason" independent of theology might do well to examine F. NIETZSCHE, THE GAY
SCIENCE 79, 91, 92-94, 98, 228-29 (W. Kaufman, trans. 1974).
195. L. Ltvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 24, 62-67, 329-30 (1968). Levy
also notes the suspicion accorded self-incrimination by the Talmud:
The insight of the Talmud that a man is closest to himself, his own relative, recog-
nizes that the instinct for self-preservation governs the actions of any normal per-
son. Consequently, only a mentally deranged individual, heedless of his own life,
would admit to a capital crime. His confession was a form of suicide, which was
sinful and violative of the instinct of self-preservation.
Id. at 438-39.
196. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 320-21.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Few would argue that the legislature is constitutionally
prohibited from permitting conscientious objectors to avoid military service when such
service conflicts with their consciences.
198. Cf. Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970) (financing of prison chap-
lains not required by free exercise clause).
The intervening defendants, who defended the Hyde Amendment, were quick to take
advantage of this argument. "Indeed, to the extent that abortion may be a religious prac-
tice-as the District Court appears to hold for some-the state is positively forbidden to
provide funds to facilitate its effectuation." Brief of Intervening Defendants-Appellees
James L. Buckley, Jesse Helms, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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however, did not materially weaken the challenge to the Hyde
Amendment. The main strength of that challenge came in its
equal protection and due process arguments.
VI. DOES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE REQUIRE THE
GOVERNMENT TO FINANCE ABORTION
The challengers to the Hyde Amendment in McRae 199 and to
the Connecticut appropriation statute in -aher 2°° successfully
maintained an equal protection argument in the district courts,
but failed on appeal. This failure was largely the result of the
proponents' inability to establish that governmental discrimina-
tory action was imposed on a suspect category or that the statutory
provision inequitably infringed on a fundamental right.201 An ex-
amination of the constitutional standards in this area suggests this
failure was inevitable.
A successful equal protection challenge often requires the
challengers to demonstrate that the allegedly unconstitutional ac-
tion has a disproportionate impact on a "suspect category." The
purpose of this initial burden is to limit the excessive judicial in-
trusion which can result from the individual Justices making sub-
jective judgments about the social impact of given laws. If the
inequality is imposed on a "suspect category," then the legislation
must be supported by a compelling state interest. 20 2 If the ine-
quality is not imposed on a "suspect category," then the legislation
need only have a rational basis to survive a constitutional chal-
lenge. Since it is rare to find either that a law has no rational basis
or that it serves a compelling state interest, the test in practice dic-
tates that legislatures may treat other groups, but not suspect cate-
gories, in differing manners.2"3
The Court consistently has refused to establish any threshold
test for what constitutes a "suspect category," leaving this defini-
199. See notes 70-90 supra and accompanying text.
200. See notes 47-69 supra and accompanying text,
201. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
202. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. at 375 n.14. Suspect classifications usually have
been found in situations concerning race or similar characteristics. See, ag., Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (political adherence); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(legitimacy of birth); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (foreign citizenship). The Court has refused to clas-
sify distinctions based on economic status as a suspect class. See Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
203. Strict scrutiny also is invoked where the discrimination concerns a "fundamental
right." This invocation will be the subject of due process rather than equal protection
analysis.
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tion to be formulated on a case-by-case basis. Professor Winter's
perceptive article concerning the economic implications of the
equal protection clause has crystallized three underlying charac-
teristics of suspect classifications. Race, for example, is a suspect
classification because it is unalterable by the individual, bears no
relation to individual merit, and, in the case of blacks, has "served
as a systematic vehicle of governmental discrimination." 2" These
criteria do not constitute a legal "test" because the Court never
has stated the elements warranting a "suspect classification." As a
hypothesis, however, Winter's criteria do explain the Court's deci-
sions on this subject and may even be broader than the Court's
determinations.2 °5 It seems unlikely, therefore, that a category
which does not meet Winter's three criteria would be listed among
the comparatively limited number of suspect categories the Court
has recognized.
The challengers in both Maher and McRae sought to establish
indigency as a suspect classification, thereby making the appropri-
ation statutes limiting the availability of abortion to indigents sub-
ject to strict scrutiny. While the indigency issue derived support
from most of the dissenters,20 6 the majority remained unim-
pressed.2" 7 Much earlier, the Court had rejected indigency as a
suspect classification 2 8 and refused to make an exception in this
context. If Professor Winter's test for determining a "suspect clas-
sification" is accepted, however, then the Maher and McRae
decisions are amply justified because indigency fails all three
criteria.20 9
204. Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality andthe Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT.
REv. 41, 97.
205. Sex, for example, easily meets all three criteria but is not yet accepted as a suspect
classification. A plurality of the Court accepted sex as a suspect category in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-88 (1973), but the following year, a majority treated sex
discrimination as subject to a rational basis test. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355
(1974).
206. In Maher, Brennan mentions indigency, while placing primary emphasis on due
process objections. 432 U.S. at 482-525. Marshall's dissent in Beal stressed the importance
of indigency. Id. at 455-62. Dissenting in Beal, Blackmun---being in a much worse posi-
tion to argue indigency in light of his opinion in Kras (see notes 170-73 supra and accom-
panying text)--emphasized due process objections and general references to indigency
which were not coupled with any specific arguments on its constitutional status. Id. at
462-63.
207. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 470-71; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17.
208. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Jeffer-
son v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
209. See note 204 supra and accompanying text. Indigency often is alterable by the
individual, is related to quality of economic decisions of marketplace "merit" and, while
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Furthermore, the recognition of indigency as a suspect cate-
gory would pose almost insurmountable practical difficulties for
the Court because it is very difficult to define indigency. Virtually
everyone at some time experiences the inability to secure an essen-
tial good or service which may concern vital rights.2 10  Defining
adequate levels of such goods and services, therefore, is extremely
difficult. The demand may vary with price and the price itself
may vary with the demand and be subject to increase by the gov-
ernment's purchase of the item in question; likewise, since the
poor bear the brunt of many local taxes, a tax-paid service is
financed largely by reducing their budgets for other needs.21'
Even if it could be demonstrated that a suspect classification
for indigency exists, it also would have to be shown that the gov-
emnment discriminates against that class before a constitutional re-
quirement of abortion funding could be secured. A statute
providing that no one should perform an abortion for a person
earning less than $5,000 a year, for example, is a clear case of
governmental discrimination against the indigent. This type of
legislation, however, is not at issue in the abortion funding cases.
Instead, the government simply has failed to make any provisions
for public funding of abortions; it neither prohibits nor finances.
the poor have always received less political consideration than the wealthy, they have never
been lynched, placed in relocation camps or imprisoned purely for their economic status.
210. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-48
(1974) (government has no power to create a "right of reply"); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (right of education); Gittlemacker v.
Prasse, 428 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1970) (prisoner's right to law library, religious services, and
medical facilities equal to those at previous prison).
211. Query: what is the duty of the legislature when the provision of one commodity
requires the reduction of another (e.g., expanding meat production decreases grain supplies
or necessitates shifts of capital away from durable goods production), such that an indigent
enjoys easy access to one commodity while another good is priced beyond his or her reach.
In at least one jurisdiction, free elective abortions were provided while free elective steril-
izations were discontinued due to a lack of funding and medical resources. Hardy, Privacy
and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v.
Williams, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 903, 925 n.119 (1976).
The regressive effect of most state and local taxes which are derived largely from the
poor also cannot be ignored. Property taxes, for instance, take about 6.43% of the income
of those earning under $2,000 a year and only 2.29% of the income of those earning over
$15,000. D. NETZER, EcoNoMIcs OF THE PROPERTY TAX 50 (1966). Even allowing for the
progressivity of income taxes, the first income group pays about 27% of their income in
taxes-nearly the same proportion as that of the higher income brackets. C. GREEN, NEG-
ATIVE TAXEs AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM 27 (1967). If the incomes of the poor were not
subject to such taxation, approximately 3.3 million families would be raised above the pov-
erty line. Id. at 26-29. Thus, funding one service for the poor out of tax revenues inevita-
bly decreases the ability of the poor to purchase other goods and services by decreasing
their disposable income.
19811
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Thus, under this analysis, the equal protection challenges would
not satisfy the threshold requirement of governmental dis-
crimination.
Consider the private physician who, as a matter of business
economics and not as a matter of law, refuses to provide "medi-
cally necessary" services to an indigent without prior payment.21 2
Under this approach, the question becomes whether the govern-
ment has a constitutional duty to meet the private physician's
business demands to prevent the creation of a barrier to the indi-
gent woman's requests. Framed in this way, the Court appears to
be in a difficult position since a discriminatory barrier is estab-
lished and maintained through governmental inaction. To hold,
however, that the government has a duty to remedy private acts
which would be unconstitutional if undertaken by the government
itself essentially would annihilate the state action doctrine.21 3 Ac-
cordingly, even though the legislature has failed to remedy a dis-
crimination created by a private physician, this inaction cannot be
considered governmental discrimination against indigents. Thus,
the threshold requirement of a successful equal protection chal-
lenge has not been met.
The Court's rejection of the suspect classification challenges to
the Hyde Amendment is consistent with the prevailing constitu-
tional standards utilized to assess the sufficiency of an equal pro-
tection challenge to legislative action. The statutory restrictions
on the public funding of abortion neither create a suspect classifi-
cation of indigency nor result in direct discriminatory action by
the government. There is, however, an alternative means of in-
yoking equal protection strict scrutiny against legislative action.
This second type of equal protection challenge concerns inequita-
212. Hardy, supra note 211, at 910-12. The actions of the physician can scarcely be
considered "state action" merely because that individual is licensed by the state. Such an
argument has been repeatedly rejected as applied to attorneys similarly licensed. See Stew-
ard v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1972); Dyer v. Rosenberg, 434 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1970); Mulligan v. Schlacter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1948). Moreover, if the physicians are
viewed as state agents practicing fiscal discrimination, they should have been defendants
rather than plaintiffs in the actions.
213. The essence of the state action doctrine is that the fourteenth amendment's re-
quirements of due process and equal protection apply to the states and, thereby, to parties
closely allied with them, but not to private acts. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1884). If the state has an affirmative obligation to remedy private
discriminatory acts, an obligation enforceable as a matter of constitutional law, then the
most private act would have to comport with the standards of due process and equal
protection.
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ble infringements on fundamental rights and asserts that the dis-
crimination is not against the indigent, but against those women
seeking an abortion rather than delivery.
The challengers to the government restrictions on abortion
also failed to support a strict scrutiny standard of review based on
the infringement of a fundamental right. Again, it was the tradi-
tional constitutional standards of equal protection which prohib-
ited the application of the fundamental right theory to the
abortion funding issue. The Court's earlier imposition of strict
scrutiny in the equal protection context had been limited mainly
to political rights involving franchise, freedom from criminal
sanctions, and other governmentally imposed penalties.2 14 The
Court failed to designate education, one of the older concerns of
American government and one the Court conceded was of great-
est importance in a democracy,25 a fundamental right. Mothers
challenging Aid to Families with Dependent Children payments
because they were limited as to total number of children covered
argued that this characteristic of the program infringed their
choice to bear children. These challenges uniformly met with re-
jection, even when the state admitted that a purpose of the legisla-
tion was to give negative incentives toward childbearing.2"6 The
distinction between a right against governmental interference,
which could be deemed fundamental, and a right to governmental
aid, which could not, had been drawn clearly in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodrguez21'7 and governed in
214. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 353 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
215. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29.
216. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), for instance, the challenge to limit-
ing AFDC payments to large families was based in part on the claim that it imposed a
discriminatory burden on those who chose to bear children. Id. at 475. The state sought to
justify the discrimination as creating an incentive against childbearing. Id. at 484. Rea-
soning that Texas had not engaged in invidious discrimination and had promoted the legit-
imate interest of education, the Court refused either to strike down the statute or to apply
strict scrutiny. See also Taylor v. Hill, 420 F. Supp. 1020, 1031 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (rejecting
a similar argument on denial of AFDC payments to mothers of unborn children as "so
wholly without merit it is difficult to articulate").
217. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court stated:
We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the District
Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have found
those arguments unpersuasive. In one further respect we find this a particularly
inappropriate case in which to subject state action to strict judicial scrutiny. ...
Each of our prior cases involved legislation which "deprived," "infringed," or
"interfered" with the free exercise of some such fundamental personal right or
liberty .... A critical distinction between those cases and the one now before us
lies in what Texas is endeavoring to do with respect to education. MR. JusTICE
BRENNAN, writing for the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan .. . expresses well the
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Maher.2t Accordingly, the Court did not recognize statutory lim-
itations on the funding of abortions as governmental interference
with a fundamental right. Thus, the Court rejected the second
type of equal protection challenge, the fundamental right theory,
in the abortion funding cases. 2 19
In addition to these equal protection arguments, the challeng-
ers in Maher and McRae asserted arguments based on substantive
due process. 220 The substantive due process argument for govern-
ment funding of abortion implicated the fifth and fourteenth
amendments22' and also raised theoretical concerns over a possi-
ble distinction between a textual constitutional right and a
nonenumerated constitutional right.222 In many respects, this dis-
tinction was the most significant weapon in the challengers' arse-
nal because it, and not the first amendment or equal protection
arguments, was at the heart of Roe v. Wade,223 which recognized
the nonenumerated constitutional right of a woman to obtain an
abortion.
VII. Do THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF THE FIFTH
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS IMPOSE A
GOVERNMENTAL DUTY TO FINANCE
ABORTION?
While the Court in both McRae and Maher focused its atten-
tion on due process considerations,224 the sole attempt to quote
these clauses consisted of two references to the "liberty" which
they guaranteed.225 At issue, however, is whether a state's failure
salient point: "This is not a complaint that Congress... has unconstitutionally
denied or diluted anyone's right to vote but rather that Congress violated the
Constitution by not extending the relief effected [to others similarly situated]
.... [T]he principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws
denying fundamental rights... is inapplicable ......
Id. at 37-39 (emphasis supplied).
218. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 471-74.
219. Id. at 474; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 311.
220. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 467; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 311.
221. See notes 224-31 infra and accompanying text.
222. See notes 105-42 supra and accompanying text.
223. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See notes 9-26 supra and accompanying text.
224. The dissenting opinions focused on due process considerations as well. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. at 329 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 482 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
225. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 312. The opinion also makes reference to "the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 311. The fifth amendment con-
tains no equal protection clause; this "component" is a judicial gloss. Although, in constru-
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to pay physicians to perform abortions on indigents may be con-
sidered a deprivation "of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." In addressing that question, it seems that a fail-
ure to provide payments to private sellers is scarcely the type of
deprivation "of life, liberty, or property" which the framers in-
tended. The content of the fifth amendment appears more related
to punishment than to a guarantee of liberty against all private
economic obstacles. Furthermore, in the past, the Court has re-
fused to hold that this guarantee against government interference
is a guarantee of a state-imposed utopia.226 If the guarantee of a
right implies the guarantee of the economic means to enjoy that
right, then the framers' formulation of the first amendment, for
example, is inconsistent. That amendment guarantees the right to
study and exercise religion, yet, in it, the framers prohibited con-
gressional action respecting the establishment of religion.227
Thus, the framers saw no inconsistency in proclaiming a right
while proscribing government assistance of that right.228
The issue can be recharacterized, however, to emphasize not
the failure to fund abortion, but the funding of childbirth without
funding abortion. One may argue that the funding of one alterna-
tive is a penalization of the other. The inequitable funding is not,
however, a penalty on the exercise of the disfavored right; the per-
son choosing to exercise the right is in no worse condition because
of the government program than he or she would be in the ab-
sence of that program. First amendment standards, designed to
protect intellectual rights and expression on which the govern-
ment must remain impartial, are inapposite.229 The relationship
between a first amendment right and a penumbral right is no more
ing this gloss, and not the original provisions, the Court does not explain its interpretation
or provide a citation.
226. See cases cited in note 208 supra. Any such effort would create a most significant
departure from the intent of the framers. See notes 227-28 infra and accompanying text.
227. The state, for example, is not obliged to provide clergy to indigent prisoners con-
fined in its jails since that might constitute the establishment of religion by the state. Cf.
Gittiemaker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970) (the requirement that a state impose no
unreasonable barriers to the free exercise of an inmate's religion cannot be equated with an
affirmative duty to provide each inmate with a clergyman of his or her choice).
228. Even the first amendment's purpose--to create the maximum dissemination of
varying viewpoints--does not justify a "right of reply" statute which requires newspapers
to print replies to certain personal attacks. Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
257-58 (1974).
229. Cf. Marker v. Shultz, 485 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (grant of a tax exemption to a
labor union did not constitute the kind of establishment of political support impliedly pro-
hibited by the first amendment).
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close than that between a religious right, which may neither be
aided nor restricted, and other first amendment rights.
Moreover, there is a serious factual objection to the argument
over the inequitable funding of abortion and childbirth. The as-
sertion that failure to fund abortion at full cost favors childbirth
assumes that the economic balance between childbirth and abor-
tion is naturally equal. Yet, in response to claims that the exclu-
sion of abortion serves the state interest of saving money, the
dissenters in both McRae and Maher argued that the state would
expend a considerable amount of welfare dollars to support the
children who otherwise would not have been born.33 Presuma-
bly, the private costs of childrearing also exceed the cost of abor-
tion. Furthermore, the Court's earlier rejection of an equal
protection challenge to a statute limiting family welfare benefits23'
indicated that economic factors weigh heavily against childbirth
and in favor of abortion. The Court has not viewed this limita-
tion, even when expressly justified as a disincentive to childbear-
ing, to create an infringement on the choice of childbearing. 232
Accordingly, legislative aid in meeting childbirth costs may, in
fact, be little more than a partial redressing of the cost imbalance,
increasing existing free choice between abortion and childbirth.
Thus, an insufficient constitutional basis on which to challenge a
legislative refusal to finance abortion, coupled with the economic
realities of financing childbirth and abortion, suggests the absence
of a governmental duty to fund the programs at issue in McRae
and Maher.
VIII. DOES THE W.4DE-BOLTON RIGHT COMPEL THE
GOVERNMENTAL FUNDING OF ABORTION?
The rejection of the argument for funding abortion under the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection as
230. "[Tlhe cost of an abortion is only a small fraction of the costs associated with
childbirth." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 355 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The District Court
correctly held, however, that the asserted interest was 'wholly chimerical' because the
'state's assertion that it saves money when it declines to pay the cost of a welfare mother's
abortion is simply contrary to undisputed facts." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 490 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
231. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
232. One of the challenges rejected by the Court in Dandridge was the argument that
the statute, by fixing a maximum allotment regardless of family size, in effect paid less per
capita for large families than for small ones, penalizing the choice to procreate. Id. at 475.
The Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to this situation. Id. at 483-87. The exclusion
of AFDC benefits to children conceived but not yet born was likewise sustained against a
similar attack in Taylor v. Hill, 420 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.N.C. 1976).
[Vol. 31.465
HARRIS v. McRE
well as the first amendment does not indicate necessarily that the
issue is closed. The Wade-Bolton right is, as noted above, sui
geners.33 The Court can be criticized for its dispositive treat-
ment of tests devised in other constitutional contexts. A discrimi-
nating review of Maher and McRae is required, therefore, to
examine the Wade-Bolton right, 3  the right asserted in Maher235
and McRae,'236 and the constitutional and governmental contexts
in which those rights exist.237
The Wade-Bolton right originates from a nonenumerated
"right of privacy."' 8 That right, as enunciated in the two cases, is
not primarily a right of seclusion239 nor a right against statutes
enforced by an invasion of privacy24° , but rather a right "to be let
alone."' 41 As the Court noted, the moral issues surrounding abor-
tion have been the subject of great controversy for centuries. 242
The nature of the Wade-Bolton right to choose may evince a duty
either to fund abortion and childbirth or to equalize the real costs
of the two procedures. The right also weighs against such fund-
ing, however, because the "right to be let alone" may imply a
power of restriction on the government to indeed "let alone."
Moreover, taxpayers whose ethical standards are offended by the
nature of abortion may have a legitimate claim thattheir "right to
be let alone" is infringed by the government's use of their tax dol-
lars to fund abortion. 4 3 Accepting this argument does not neces-
233. See notes 9-40 supra and accompanying text. The term Wade-Bolton is used to
refer to the rights of privacy developed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
234. Id.
235. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
236. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
237. See notes 189-231 supra and accompanying text.
238. See note 233 supra.
239. Brandeis, however, originally envisioned the right of privacy to be a right of seclu-
sion. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 132, at 193.
240. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see notes 141-42 supra and accom-
panying text.
241. See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
242. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 130-52.
243. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court noted that standing concerns
whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has a personal stake in the outcome
and whether the dispute touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal inter-
ests. Id. at 101. The Court then articulated the double nexus approach: First, the taxpayer
must establish a logical link between that status and the type of enactment under attack;
second, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of
the constitutional infringement alleged. Id. at 102.
The standing requirement is not satisfied, however, if the taxpayer is seeking to employ
a federal court as a forum for his or her generalized grievances about the conduct of gov-
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sarily mean that the government must refuse to tax for a service it
considers beneficial when certain taxpayers object. The argument
does indicate that the government may, through its use of the
democratic process, have an interest in respecting those rights-an
interest in protecting its citizens' consciences with which the courts
ought not to interfere. 2"
The specific remedy sought in Maher and McRae-an injunc-
tion from an undemocratic court ordering democratic legislatures
to provide funding for projects their electors presumably found
morally repugnant-also must be viewed in its historical context.
Anglo-American constitutional thought has stressed the require-
ment of no taxation without the consent of elected legislators and
has sought to place fiscal decisions at the level of representation
closest to the people.245 The judiciary acts beyond its customary
boundaries in weighing such matters. Judicial intrusion is only
warranted when the legislature funds in a manner inconsistent
with free institutions. It is difficult to argue, however, that the leg-
islature's decision to respect the ethical qualms of a large part of
the citizenry constitutes a decision of that nature.
Additionally, the assessment of the programs at issue in Maher
and McRae requires an analysis of economic matters not available
to the judiciary. The minority, in its cursory rejection of the argu-
ment that the state has an economic interest in financing child-
birth and not abortion, assumed that because each abortion costs
less than each delivery, the cost to the state is less for abortion.
The Court failed to recognize, however, that the availability of
abortion may discourage contraception 246 or that medical con-
ernment. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974). The absence of standing
in such an instance indicates that the subject matter should be committed to the congres-
sional forum and ultimately to the political process. Id. at 179.
244. A constitutional right to conscientious objection only narrowly missed insertion
into the Constitution. Madison's initial proposals for the first amendment included the
following provision: "nor shall the full and equal rights ofconscience be in any manner, or
in any pretext, infringed." Madison's proposal for the second amendment would have ad-
ded the provision that "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be com-
pelled to bear them in person." 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834).
These provisions were removed at the objection of Mr. Gerry who worried that the govern-
ment might use them to exempt the bulk of the population from militia duty, hence under-
mining the militia system and creating an argument for a standing army. Id. at 752.
245. See notes 152-63 supra.
246. The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists noted in 1970 that
"[e]vidence from other countries suggests that easy abortion can in fact encourage unplan-
ned pregnancy." The Abortion Act (1967): Findings of an Inquiry into the First Year'r
Working of The Act Conducted by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 2
BRIT. MED. J. 529, 534 (1970). A study in Britain a year later showed that only nine per-
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siderations may necessitate several abortions for each birth
prevented.247
The decision whether to provide funding for abortion, there-
fore, involves a number of economic considerations: the cost to
the individual of childbearing or abortion; the availability of pri-
vate groups to fund or reduce the cost of childbearing or abor-
tion;248 whether the increase in demand for abortion would
increase its present cost, unnecessarily divert medical resources,249
or interfere with medical training at school-run hospitals;250 and
the impact of repeat abortions on the cost of care for a mother
who later decides to bear children.2  It also is theoretically possi-
ble that reductions in the birth rate will have an economic impact
cent of aborting patients were using any form of contraception at the time of conception.
Stallworthy, Moolgaoker & Walsh, Legal Abortion: A Critical Assessment of its Risks, 2
LANCET 1245 (1971). Similar findings have been reported in Australia, Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Japan, suggesting that the phenomenon approaches universality. See Hardy, supra
note 211, at 928 n.128.
247. Repeat abortions have been noted in the United States (where, within five years of
legalization, 25% of the abortions in New York were being performed on persons having
had previous abortions) as well as in other nations. In Japan, for instance, one study
showed patients electing abortion to average 1.1 abortions per patient per year. Hardy,
supra note 211, at 928-29. A woman terminating a pregnancy by abortion will reconceive,
on the average, once every nine months. A woman terminating a pregnancy in childbirth
will only reconceive on the average of once every 18 to 27 months. D. CALAHAN, ABOR-
TION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY 290 (1970); Frederikson & Brackett, Demographic
Effects ofAbortion, 83 PuB. HEALTH REP. 999 (1968). One birth, therefore, may in fact be
replaced by two to three abortions.
248. In one test case, for instance, it was shown that the witness whose affidavit was
relied on to show that abortions were not available to indigents was shown elsewhere to
have made public statements that because of physicians' willingness to actpro bono, indi-
gents seeking abortion no longer had to worry about financial barriers. Hardy, supra note
211, at 911 nA3.
249. See note 211 supra. The British Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
likewise has complained, following a survey of 233 departments performing 27,000 abor-
tions annually, that the additional burden disrupts some gynecologists' work. "If [a gyne-
cologist] is asked to assess 5 to 10 new cases a week, which is not uncommon, in the course
of two outpatient sessions, serious dislocation of his other work results, and delays in his
attending to other patients suffering from gynecological complaints are inevitable." The
Abortion Act, supra note 246, at 533.
250. See generally Stone, Gordon & Rovinsky, Impact of a LiberalizedAbortion Law on
the Medical Schools, 111 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 728 (1971).
251. Various studies of abortion have indicated that repeat abortions can increase the
probability of tubal pregnancies, which require emergency surgical intervention, and ap-
proximately double the probability of surgical intervention during future pregnancies.
Hardy, supra note 211, at 930. Where the abortion is accomplished by hysterectomy, which
does not involve removal of the uterus but only its opening, many physicians think that
future deliveries should be by caesarian section. Abortion: Hearings on SJ Res. 119 Before
the Subcomrr on Const. Amendments of the Senate Comn on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., pt.
2, 2d Sess. 80 (1976).
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later when the percentage of the population which is retired in-
creases and that which is of working age declines. The Supreme
Court is poorly suited to determine these pragmatic issues since its
focus is limited to the information presented by the parties.
Furthermore, reality must be permitted occasionally to intrude
into the domain of law and scholarship. Legislators do not refuse
to fund abortion because of its cost, because they favor childbirth,
or because they fear an increase in medical complications. These
representatives refuse funding because large numbers of voting
constituents consider abortion to be a form of homicide which, if
financed through taxation, denotes them as moral "accessories
before the fact." This position is not irrational.252 Accordingly,
the constitutional provisions at issue demand an assessment of
whether the legislature can consider the conscientious objections
252. The fetus exhibits heartbeat, EEG patterns, and reaction to touch and pain within
the first trimester. Hefferman, The Early Biography of Everyman, in ABORTION AND So-
CIAL JUSTICE 5-17 (T. Hilgers & D. Horan eds. 1973). Live births following abortion have
been noted frequently. During the first year of New York's liberalized statutes, for exam-
ple, 49 live births occurred in the course of abortions; two of these aborted fetuses survived
the year. Hearings on SJ Res. 119 Before the Subcomrn on Const. 4mendments of the
Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., pt. 2, 2d Sess. 133 (1976). Another study, span-
ning a six month period, found 27 live births and one long-term survival; another fetus,
aborted by saline early in the second trimester, nonetheless survived another five months.
Horan, Gorby & Hilgers, Abortions and the Supreme Court, in ABORTION AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE, supra at 316.
Two letters, submitted to the International Correspondence Society of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists in response to the survival of a second trimester fetus for 27 minutes
after an abortion, illustrate the measures which might be taken during the abortion proce-
dure. The first letter counselled that:
[M]anagement of the woman and fetus with signs of life must be appropriate to
the major object of therapeutic abortion: To terminate the woman's pregnancy as
rapidly as possible with the least physical and psychological injury ....
Since viewing the abortus may be traumatic to the patient, the abortus should
be separated from the patient and removed from her room. . . . If respirations
or other movements continue for a few minutes, and are not just reflex move-
ments, the patient's physician, if he is not in attendance, should probably be con-
tacted and informed of the situation. The pediatrician on call should probably be
appraised of the situation if signs of life continue.
L Proposed Const. Amendments on Abortion. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Const. Rights of the House Comnm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., pt. 2, 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 947
(1976).
Another response noted that such survivals are rare in saline abortion, but occur in
about ten percent of abortions induced by prostaglandin:
With Prostagandin, fetal demis usually occurs during the process of labor and
delivery. At the time of delivery, it has been our policy to wrap the fetus in a
towel. The fetus is then moved to another room while our attention is turned to
the care of the gravida. She is examined to determine whether complete placental
expulsion has occurred and the extent of vaginal bleeding. Once we are sure that
her condition is stable, the fetus is evaluated. Almost invariably all signs of life
have ceased.
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of its taxpayers against the services which it is argued they must
finance.
The Court has consistently recognized the importance of such
matters of conscience .13 Justice Brandeis, the sire of the right of
privacy, noted in later years that "[t]he makers of our Constitution
...recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. ... They sought to protect Ameri-
cans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions. 254 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Doe,
recognized that the state has a valid interest in protecting denomi-
national hospitals from infringement on their conscientious objec-
tions to abortion." There is no reason that the same analysis
should not apply to the taxpayer. In other contexts, the Court fre-
quently has observed that rights of freedom do not necessarily in-
elude the right to infringe on the freedom of others.256 It appears,
253. See, ag., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1970) (draft exemption provision
focuses on individual conscientious belief and not on sectarian affiliations); United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (freedom of thought includes freedom of religious belief and
embraces the right to maintain theories of life and death which rank as heresy to followers
of orthodox faiths); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (freedom of conscience
and freedom to adhere to religious worship can be restricted by law); Arver v. United
States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (statute upheld which exempted members of sects whose tenets
exclude the moral right to engage in war from military service).
254. Olmsted v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), over-
ruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
255. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 197-98.
Mhe hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion ... . Further, a
physician or any other employee has the right to refrain, for moral or religious
reasons, from participating in the abortion procedure. These provisions obviously
are in the statute in order to afford appropriate protection to the individual and to
the denominational hospital.
Id.
The Ninth Circuit has relied on this language to refuse to require the performance of an
abortion at a hospital operated by a religious institution. "Plaintiff fails to distinguish be-
tween action taken to preserve the 'governmentrs] neutrality in the face of religious differ-
ences' and action which affirmatively prefers one religion over another. . . . Here
Congress quite properly chose to protect the freedom of religion of those with religious or
moral scruples against sterilizations or abortions." Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of
Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479
F.2d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 1973).
256. Even the right of privacy, for example, is subject to limitations when it infringes
on the right to freedom of the press enjoyed by others. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Conversely, the freedom of the press is subject to limitations when it invades privacy. FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (limitation on broadcasting of offensive but not
obscene materials upheld, since the offensive material "confronts the citizen, not only in
public, but in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the first amendment rights of an intruder"). Id. at 748; Rowan v. Post Office
Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (statutes upheld which barred mailing of offensive materials into
home where owner objected). Likewise, the right to speak does not include the right to use
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therefore, that when the rights asserted in Maher and McRae are
viewed in isolation, there are strong constitutional and practical
reasons for confining the resolution of those conflicts to the legis-
lature, not the judiciary.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Maher and McRae reached a correct
result based on deficient analysis. The argument for a constitu-
tional duty to finance abortion for indigents is exceedingly weak
under the first amendment and the prevailing standards of due
process and equal protection.2 57 By treating the Wade-Bolton
right as the equivalent of an enumerated right, however, the Court
failed to account for the unusual characteristics of that right."5 8
Furthermore, the Court completely ignored the real basis for the
legislation at issue-conscientious objection by the legislators'
constituents.25 9 The Court, as a result, was forced to substitute
judicially constructed state interests with no basis in reality for
legitimate interests worthy of consideration.
a broadcasting sound truck with such amplification as to disturb unwilling listeners. Ko-
vacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
257. See notes 224-29 supra and accompanying text.
258. See notes 10-40 & 234-51 supra and accompanying text.
259. See notes 251-52 supra and accompanying text.
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